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Abstract: 
In the early stock market in London there were substantial risks of non-payment and 
fraud. (Mortimer, 1801) According to Hobbesian theory, we would expect stock markets 
to develop only after government has implemented rules and regulations to eliminate 
these problems. The historical account, however, provides evidence that solutions to 
these problems did not come from the state. This article outlines the emergence of the 
London Stock Exchange, which was created by eighteenth century brokers who 
transformed coffeehouses into private clubs that created and enforced rules.  Rather than 
relying on public regulation to enforce contracts and reduce fraud, brokers consciously 
found a way to solve their dilemmas by forming a self-policing club.  
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 1
Introduction 
It is commonly held that government is needed to enforce contracts in financial 
markets.  According to Hobbesian theory, without external enforcement, the incentives to 
cheat would prevail and welfare-enhancing trades would not take place.1 While it is 
certainly true that rules can improve contractual performance, a major option that is often 
ignored is the possibility of privately generated rules. Upon examining the historical 
record we can see that, by and large, rules governing financial trading developed 
independently from the state. The focus of this paper is the evolution of the London Stock 
Exchange.2  Rather than having public origins, the London Stock Exchange emerged 
when eighteenth-century brokers transformed coffeehouses into private clubs to form a 
system of self-regulation. 
Beyond merely providing buyers and sellers a location to meet, one of the most 
important functions of a stock exchange is fostering an orderly atmosphere where traders 
follow a common set of rules. Exchange members must constantly seek ways to attract 
business and one way to improve business is by providing assurances against fraud.3 By 
cooperating and forming a club for the joint provision and consumption of rule 
enforcement, stockbrokers enhance the value of their enterprise.4 This stands against the 
idea that stock exchanges would fail to organize properly without direction from the 
state.5  
                                                
1
 Glaeser, et al (2001), Buchanan (1975), Tullock (1972, 1974). 
2
 Silber (1981), Carlton (1984), Fischel and Grossman (1984), Macey and Kanda (1990), Chambers and 
Carter (1990), Mahoney (1997), Banner (1998), and Macey and O'Hara (1999), analyze self-regulating 
aspects of other financial exchanges. For book length histories of the London Stock Exchange see Wincott 
(1946), Morgan and Thomas (1969),  Jenkins (1973), and Michie (1999). 
3
 Banner (1998:132). 
4
 Buchanan (1965). 
5
 Frye (2000). 
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There are many advantages of market regulation over government regulation. 
First and foremost, when the private sector has the ability to experiment, brokers can try 
different regulations to see which ones are most successful.  It is choice that allows 
groups of freely associating individuals to discover new ways of governing their conduct. 
As Hayek wrote, “the value of freedom consists mainly in the opportunity it provides for 
the growth of the undesigned, and the beneficial functioning of a free society rests largely 
on the existence of such freely grown institutions.”6 If private clubs, such as stock 
exchanges, have the choice to pick their self-regulations they can attempt to discover 
what ones are beneficial. This contrasts with the position that rules need to imposed from 
the top down from the state. Hayek explained it well:  
There is an advantage in obedience to such rules not being coerced, not only 
because coercion as such is bad, but because it is, in fact, often desirable that rules 
should be observed only in most instances…It is this flexibility of voluntary rules 
which in the field of morals makes gradual evolution and spontaneous growth 
possible, which allows further experience to lead to modifications and 
improvements. Such an evolution is only possible with rules which are neither 
coercive or deliberately imposed—…Unlike any deliberately imposed coercive 
rules, which can be changed only discontinuously and for all at the same time, 
rules of this kind allow for gradual and experimental change. The existence of 
individuals and groups simultaneously observing partially different rules provide 
the opportunity for selection of the more effective ones.7 
 
If brokers have the ability to choose they can continuously adopt new ways of self-
policing.8 While it may be the case the regulation of a stock market is necessary there is 
no reason to conclude that it must be done by the state.  
                                                
6
 Hayek ([c1960] 1978:61). This is further developed in Rothbard (1970). 
7
 Hayek ([c1960] 1978:62-63). 
8
 This is not to say at every given instant people will break their bargains insisting that the old rules no 
longer apply; they will however have to capability of adopting new arrangements and procedures for future 
contracts. Benson (1990, 1993), Stringham (1999). 
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The Emergence of Stock Exchanges 
Stock exchanges were not suddenly invented. No governor declared the 
establishment of the London Stock Exchange; rather it evolved over time. 9  Joint stock 
companies had first come into being in the sixteenth century and it was not for some time 
before there were enough tradable stocks to warrant the specialized occupation of 
stockbrokers. 10 At first ownership of stocks was not widespread and sales were 
conducted on a small scale directly between buyers and sellers, with trades typically 
consisting of one owner divesting his shares to another owner or someone else on the 
restricted list of eligible buyers. 11 Liberalization of the banking sector at the end of the 
seventeenth century increased the ability for companies to borrow funds, which led to an 
increase in the quantity of joint stock companies from fifteen to a hundred and fifty in a 
matter of six years.12 The earliest evidence of stockbrokers in England appears in the late 
seventeenth century and in 1692 the trade was important enough for the weekly 
periodical Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade to begin publishing stock 
prices for eight companies.13  
Initially brokers dealt in stocks as a side business  but eventually people began 
specializing in stockbrokerage.14 They traded at the Royal Exchange, which housed other 
merchants such as grocers, druggists, and clothiers. 15 As the number of stockbrokers 
grew it became evident they were not entirely welcome at the Royal Exchange, and in 
                                                
9
 Smith (1929: 206), Wincott (1946:1). 
10
 Kindleberger (1984:196). The Amsterdam Bourse of the seventeenth century is what would considered 
the first stock market (Allen and Gale, 1994:13). This paper focuses on the growth of stock trading in 
London, which eventually became the more developed market. 
11
 Jenkins (1973:13).  
12
 Jenkins (1973:18). 
13
 Houghton (1727), Neal (1987:99). 
14
 Jenkins (1973:19-20) points out, “they were by no means necessarily stock-brokers. They could deal in 
anything they liked—stockes, gold, haberdashy, fish, bread, carpentry, spectacles, even bows and arrows.” 
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1696 the government passed an act “To Restrain the Number and the Practice of Brokers 
and Stockjobbers.”16 This act was to regulate and license brokers but they were able to 
avoid it merely by leaving the Royal Exchange and setting up business elsewhere in the 
city.17 With the exception of dealings in foreign issues most brokers left the Royal 
Exchange in 1698.18  
The Use of Coffeehouses 
Since there was no area designated as a stock exchange, trading took place in 
informal quarters, largely in the various coffeehouses between Cornhill and Lombard 
streets. 19 Eighteenth century writer Thomas Mortimer wrote the “usual rendezvous of 
Stock-jobbers” was “Jonathan's Coffee-house, in Exchange-Alley.”20 The coffeehouses 
accommodated various brokers, some of whom even had offices there.21 One broker put 
out the following advertisement in 1695 in Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and 
Trade, “John Castaing at Johnathan’s Coffee House on Exchange, buys and sells all 
Blank an Benefit Tickets; and all other Stocks and Shares.”22 Brokers would go to the 
same coffeehouses everyday to conduct their business.23 One who had been successful in 
                                                                                                                                              
15
 Wincott (1947:7). 
16
 Lest it be thought that the atmosphere was completely laissez faire there were quite a few restrictions on 
the market (Banner, 1998) but from a modern economics viewpoint we can tell that most all of them were 
not advancing the market. 
17
 Reed (1975:5), Morgan and Thomas (1969:22-24).  
18
 Some trading took place on the streets and alleys but as of 1700 London city officials did not allow such 
congregating in an effort to keep the streets clear. (Morgan and Thomas, 1969:27; Wincott, 1947:7). 
19
 Jenkins (1973:20), Wincott (1946:7). 
20
 Mortimer (1801:xvi). 
21
 Jenkins (1973:40). 
22
 Reprinted in Mirowski (1981: 564). 
23
 The English coffeehouses were different from most modern American coffee shops, serving bottled beer, 
wines, spirits, sandwiches, biscuits, and cheese in addition to coffee. (Jenkins, 1973:41), (Morgan and 
Thomas, 1969:67). Various coffeehouses provided their customers with a meeting place that appealed to 
different types of people: writers and critics went to Will’s, philosophers went to the Grecian, White’s 
Chocolate House attracted gamblers, and Lloyd’s Coffee House, which later became Lloyd’s of London 
specialized in shipping and marine insurance. (Jenkins, 1973:41; Raynes, 1948:110). 
 5
his dealings was described by his peers as, “the leader and oracle of Jonathan’s Coffee 
House.”24  
Since this was what might be considered a more complicated market and it was 
common to make bargains that were settled quarterly there were many things that could 
go wrong.25 One problem was deliberate fraud. John Houghton wrote in his periodical in 
1692, “Without a doubt, if those trades were better known, 'twoud be a great advantage to 
the kingdom; only I must caution beginners to be very wary, for there are many cunning 
artists among them.”26 Another problem was unintentional default.  Since many weeks 
could pass before trade came to completion brokers ran the risk of if their trading 
counterparts not being able to pay on settlement day. Mortimer stated, “problems arise if 
the person making the trade does not have the ability (cash) to settle, for in many cases a 
broker and his customer had no money.”27  
 The first response to this problem is we see defaulters being shunned and banned 
from the Jonathan’s.  If a broker did not follow through with his bargains he was labeled 
a lame duck. In 1761 Thomas Mortimer’s described a lame duck as “A name given in 
’Change Alley to those who refuse to fulfil their engagements…There are some at almost 
every rescounter. The punishment for nonpayment is banishment from Jonathan’s but 
they can still act as brokers at the offices.”28 They did not physically punish bad brokers 
but merely turned them away from the coffeehouse; being expelled from meant a 
significant loss of business for a broker.29 
                                                
24
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:46). 
25
 Mortimer (1801:47), Dickson (1967:491). 
26
 Houghton (1727:5). 
27
 Mortimer (1801:53-4). 
28
 Reprinted in Morgan and Thomas (1969:61). 
29
 Jenkins (1973:44). 
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Despite being banished defaulters would later come back to the coffeehouses, 
which would pose a problem for those who were unaware they were dealing with 
someone with a bad track record. As a solution they decided to write the names of 
defaulters on a blackboard as a warning to others not to deal with them.30  This form of 
boycott acted as form of non-coercive enforcement against those who were unreliable.31 
Forming an Exclusive Club 
While shunning functioned to a degree, eventually some brokers decided that 
coffeehouses open to the public left more to be desired. Brokers felt the need to become 
more exclusive to avoid having to deal with, in the words of one historian, “riff-raff.”32 
During the time period different groups experimented with different settings to trade 
stocks or other securities. In 1765 the Bank of England built a Rotunda where trading 
took place but this did not prove to be successful. An 1824 book described the trading 
there of a “less respectable description.”33 Brokers were noisy and were generally 
considered with disrepute. These settings were too chaotic to conduct business so a better 
solution was needed.34  
It is not surprising that hoards of traders, including dishonest ones, would attempt 
to conduct business in the same few places. With the potential gains high, cheaters could 
theoretically dissipate the rest of the traders’ profits. Eventually one group of brokers 
devised a strategy to eliminate some of the disarray.  In 1761 Thomas Mortimer wrote, 
“The gentlemen at this very period of time…have taken it into their heads that some of 
                                                
30
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:61). 
31
 Caplan and Stringham (2001) discusses boycotts as an enforcement mechanism. 
32
 Jenkins (1973:44). 
33
 Reprinted in Michie (1999:44). 
34
 Jenkins (1973:44), Morgan and Thomas (1969:58-59). We can imagine if such an arrangement was 
successful trading might take place in establishments such as the London Stock Rotunda and the New York 
Stock Rotunda. 
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the fraternity are not so good as themselves…and have entered into an association to 
exclude them from J-----‘s coffee-house.”35 In 1762 one hundred and fifty brokers formed 
a club and contracted with Jonathan’s Coffeehouse to use it exclusively. Each member 
would pay eight pounds per year to rent out the Coffeehouse.36 By transforming 
Jonathan’s into a private club they would be able to exclude nonmembers and expel those 
who were unruly. Historians refer to the founders of the club as the ‘more substantial’37 
and the ‘better sort’38 of brokers. If only reputable brokers were allowed in the club there 
would be a lot less potential for bad dealings.  
Unfortunately for the new venture an ejected broker brought suit against the 
newly formed club and the government interfered with their plans by declaring that 
Jonathan’s Coffeehouse did not have the right to exclude outsiders.39 This put a damper 
on using coffeehouses as a private exchanges so as an alternative strategy in 1773 brokers 
organized to purchase a building for their own. This new building was known as New 
Jonathan’s and was open to anyone so long as they paid the daily admission fee, which 
covered expenses such as rent.40 In 1773 the Gentlemen’s Magazine reported, “New 
Jonathan’s came to the resolution that instead of its being called New Jonathan’s, it 
should be called The Stock Exchange, which is to be wrote over the door.”41 Although it 
was known as the Stock Exchange it must be noted that it is different from modern 
notions of a Stock Exchange. In 1801 Thomas Mortimer stated, “Brokers assemble at a 
                                                
35
 Reprinted in Smith (1929:215). 
36
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:68). 
37
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:68). 
38
 Jenkins (1973:45). 
39
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:68), Jenkins (1973:45). 
40
 Wincott (1946:9). 
41
 Reprinted in Jenkins (1973:45) 
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very large coffeehouse, called the Stock-Exchange.”42 This coffeehouse/stock exchange 
had no formal membership and was run by two committees, one representing the 
coffeehouse owners and another representing the customers. 43   
Still there was no formal membership and anyone could enter upon paying the 
daily entrance fee. The fee might have been enough to keep out some vagrants but after a 
few years it became evident that it did not suffice. The price of admission was low 
enough that untrustworthy brokers were still present causing problems for both investors 
and brokers.44  Brokers wanted to have an even more exclusive club and in 1801 they 
decided to require that entrants be subscribed members.45  They posted the following:  
The Proprietors of the Stock Exchange, at the solicitation of a very considerable 
number of the Gentlemen frequenting it, and with the unanimous concurrence of 
the Committee appointed for General Purposes, who were requested to assist them 
in forming such regulations as may be deemed necessary, have resolved 
unanimously, that after 27 February next this House shall finally be shut as a 
Stock Exchange, and opened as a Subscription Room on Tuesday 3 March at ten 
guineas per Annum ending 1 March in each succeeding year. All person desirous 
of becoming subscribers are requested to signify the same in writing to E. 
Whitfor, Secretary to the joint committees on or before 31 inst. In order to their 
being balloted for by the said committees.46 
 
Brokers were required to follow a set of rules in order to be a member of the 
Subscription Room. They stated in 1801 that it “being desirous that the Stock 
Subscription Room should acquire and preserve the most respectable character and 
considering that for such purpose it is indisputably necessary to prevent the practice of 
every disorderly action” they would levy fines on rule breakers “to be paid to the 
Secretary of the Committee for general Purposes and by them applied to charitable 
                                                
42
 Mortimer (1801:150). 
43
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:68), Jenkins (1973:45). 
44
 Wincott (1946:13). 
45
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:68). 
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uses.”
47
 This new enforcement mechanism would inhibit misconduct by keeping club 
members under control. 
As with all new ventures there were some wrinkles in this new Stock Subscription 
Room and it would take some reorganization before problems were ironed it. Many of the 
frequenters did not want to see the changes and were generally uncooperative. One 
member was fined but refused to pay contending that he should not have to go along with 
the new rules.48 In the following months the Stock Subscription Room disintegrated, 
leaving those who desired a stricter more exclusive club with no choice but to go off and 
start a new exchange. With much preparations and an offer to old exchange brokers to 
become members, they raised funds by issuing four hundred shares at ç HDFK RI ZKLFK
each person could own up to four shares, and constructed the new building over the next 
year. 49 
Challenges and Competition 
The new Stock Exchange at Capel Court could now enact rules that had been 
unanimously agreed upon by it members but not surprisingly the excluded brokers were 
unhappy with their position.50 In 1810 some petitioned the government to undermine the 
Stock Exchange by forcing it open to the public. The proposed bill stated:  
There is at this time no open Public Market for the sale and purchase of the Public 
Stocks, Funds, Government and other securities; and that they place wherein the 
chief part of this business hath been hitherto and is now transacted, is a private 
room from which the public is excluded; and it would be of great convenience and 
                                                                                                                                              
46
 Reprinted in Michie (1999, p.35).   
47
 Reprinted in Morgan and Thomas (1969:69). It is interesting to note that the fines were donated to 
charity rather than used a means of enriching those levying the fines. For an account of the rise of criminal 
law as a means of enriching the government see Benson (1990, 1994). 
48
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:69). Interestingly one David Ricardo was a member at this time but he 
eventually resigned. (Jenkins, 1973:51). 
49
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:70), Reed (1975:23). 
50
 Around this time the Bank of England considered building a new public exchange it decided against it. 
(Morgan and Thomas, 1969:71). 
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advantage to His Majesty’s subjects if a public open market were established in a 
suitable situation for the purchase and sale of the said Stocks, Funds and 
Securities.51 
 
If the government interfered with this private arrangement the untrustworthy brokers 
could have achieved forced access into the new location.  
Fortunately for the Exchange the government did not demand public access as it 
had in the case with Jonathan’s Coffee House. A member in declared that the 1810 bill 
was, “under the specious pretext of creating an open Stock Market within the City of 
London,” but that it truly was, “to shelter convicted defaulters and afford new facilities to 
the criminal designs of notorious and unprincipled gamblers.” With its establishment the 
Stock Exchange would be “open to honourable men and closed shut for ever to notorious 
cheats.”52 The London Stock Exchange was now able to enact and enforce rules internal 
to its members; anyone who was not a member was barred from the premises.53 
The fact that membership is costly and exchanges can expel brokers has led some 
to call this exclusivity an example of cartel behavior.54 Could it be that such cooperation 
between brokers was simply a form of collusion?55 While the ability to enforce rules does 
allow brokers to punish non-cooperators, it does not enable them to enforce any rule they 
wish.  As Mahoney points out: 
An exchange's attempts to charge a monopoly price for its members' services will 
harm only the members if the exchange faces sufficient competition from other 
markets. Other exchanges will capture trading volume by offering lower 
transaction costs and investors will be no worse off by virtue of a foolish attempt 
to charge a monopoly price in a competitive market. If stock markets face 
                                                
51
 Reprinted in Morgan and Thomas (1969:72). 
52
 Reprinted in Morgan and Thomas (1969:72). 
53
 Johnstone (1814:9). 
54
 Demsetz (1969:19-22), Welles (1975).   
55
 Cowen (1992) and Cowen and Sutter (1999) claim that cooperation between competitors is a recipe for 
collusion.  
 11 
sufficient competition, then, restrictive rules will survive only to the extent they 
are efficient.56 
 
Rules that enhance the value of the product, such as assurances against fraud, will be self-
enforcing, and as long as there are no legal barriers to entry, rules that are collusive will 
break down.57  If Exchange rules were simply collusive, customers would gladly seek 
brokers who did not follow the rules and charged less for the same service. This 
competition would make the cartel dissolve. On the other hand, if the rules were actually 
providing assurances against fraud, there would be little incentive for customers to 
actively seek out brokers who did not abide by Exchange rules.58  
  At the time, the London Stock Exchange members faced competition from a 
number of sources making the market quite contestable. Those who wished to operate 
outside of the Stock Exchange’s rules could conduct business at private offices, the Royal 
Exchange, the Bank of England, other regional exchanges, or in foreign exchanges such 
as the Amsterdam Bourse.59 This competition kept a check on the Stock Exchange from 
enacting rules that are highly inefficient. In some cases rules were too onerous but were 
struck down because of the threat of losing business to nonmembers.60   These outsiders 
were considered an “annoyance,” which is hardly surprising since they were in direct 
competition. To attract business the London Stock Exchange advertised in the press 
                                                
56
 Mahoney (1997:1477). Mahoney (1997:1482) adds, “Restrictive exchange rules may appear more benign 
when viewed as a means of preventing free riding and appropriation by non-members.” 
57
 Telser (1980), Caplan and Stringham (2001). Collusive rules will face pressure both from outside 
competition and from within the exchange. As Mahoney (1997:1491) writes, “The fact that different 
exchange members have different preferences regarding restrictive rules reduces the danger of a stable 
brokers' cartel.” 
58
 This is not to say that customers would only use brokers who were members of the Exchange. Brokers 
who established enough trusting relationships would be in less need of Exchange rules and bargain hunters 
who were willing to take their chances with a bucket shop could do so.    
59
 Mortimer (1801:76), Kregel (1995: 468), Morgan and Thomas (1969:140), Michie (1985:61-82), Neal 
(1987), Stringham (2001). 
60
 Morgan and Thomas (1969:140). 
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publicizing that nonmembers were not “under the control of the Committee,”61 serving as 
an indication that members of the London Stock Exchange were more dependable.  
For many years the London Stock Exchange had no formal constitution and it was 
not until 1812 when they issued their first rulebook.62 The need to attract business not 
legal rules made the exchange act in a judicious manner.63 It was in the interest of the 
exchange to have a good reputation otherwise it would lose business. In 1877 even the 
government declared that the Stock Exchange’s rules, “had been salutary to the interests 
of the public” and that the Exchange acted “uprightly, honestly, and with a desire to do 
justice.” It concluded saying that their private rules were “capable of affording relief and 
exercising restraint far more prompt and often satisfactory than any within the read of the 
courts of law.”64 The club has an incentive to make sure the exchange is operating 
properly so will enact and enforce rules as efficiently as they know how. A disinterested 
court or regulator on the other hand would have little incentive and even less knowledge 
to be able to enforce the rules of a stock exchange.65  
Conclusion 
Although there may good reason to worry that in a complicated stock market 
there are greater chances of fraud, it seems clear that there was no missing market in this 
realm. Rather than relying on public regulation to enforce contracts, brokers consciously 
found a way to solve this dilemma by creating and enforcing a system of private rules.  
Since it was their goal to promote trade, the interest of the members was aligned with the 
                                                
61
 Reprinted in Morgan and Thomas (1969:141). 
62
 Mirowski (1981:573), Morgan and Thomas (1969:74). 
63
 Boot et al. (1993:1178) write, “Since a discretionary guarantee of a highly reputed guarantor can be more 
valuable than an enforceable guarantee of a less reputable guarantor, prices of discretionary guarantees 
need not be less than those for enforceable guarantees.” On the importance of incentives rather than legal 
rules see Hasnas (1995a, 1995b) Klein (1997). 
64
 Reprinted in Wincott (1946:27). 
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interest of its customers. It was their ability to experiment and their need to attract 
business that allowed for the discovery of better ways of organizing and self-regulating.  
Under laissez faire, firms and clubs, such the London Stock Exchange, can choose 
to organize in any way they wish, and those that find successful ways of operating will 
flourish.66 Since the London Stock Exchange did not have a legal monopoly it needed to 
make sure that its existence was beneficial. Dennis Carlton writes, “It is useful to view 
exchanges as competing (or potentially competing) with each other. As in other markets, 
competition is a substitute for regulation. The more competition there is, the more likely 
it is that exchanges themselves will promulgate rules and regulations that benefit and 
protect consumers in much the same ways as competition in other markets protects 
consumers.”
67
 When exchanges are free to organize without government regulation it 
allows for the discovery process of the market to operate. In their quest for more profits 
brokers will have the incentive to discover better ways of self-policing. The evolution of 
the London Stock Exchange provides evidence that beneficial regulations can be created 
through the market. 
                                                                                                                                              
65
 Stringham (1999). 
66
 Other stock exchanges such as those in America evolved with quite different structures. (Michie, 1986).  
67
 Carlton (1984,259). 
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